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ARTICLES
A CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR GOVERNMENTAL CO-
OPERATION WITH FAITH-BASED SOCIAL SERVICE
PROVIDERSt
Carl H. Esbeck*
It is often said that America's founding was an experiment in government.
Certainly few features of the American constitutional settlement left more to
future chance-and were more of a break with existing European pat-
terns-than the Establishment Clause set out in the First Amendment. The
new Republic sought to rely on transcendent principles to justify its unpre-
cedented advancements in human liberty.' Concurrently, the Founders reject-
t This Article was first presented at a workshop on the Constitutionality of Governmental Coopera-
tion with Religious Social Ministries on August 2-3. 1996, at Washington, D.C., sponsored by the Religious
Social-Sector Project of the Center for Public Justice.
* Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.S., Iowa
State University of Science & Technology, 1971; J.D., Cornell University, 1974.
' The Declaration of Independence, for example, refers to these transcending principles as "self-evi-
dent truths," "Creator-endowed inalienable rights," and "the laws of nature and of nature's God." These
higher law principles did not necessarily rest upon a common confession of revealed truth. For some among
the Founders, the principles were derived from a faith in reason. But the reliance on transcendent principles,
whether extrapolated from reason or revelation, did mean agreement at the level of the moral basis for po-
litical action. See. e.g., JOHN G. WEST, JR., THE POLITICS OF REVELATION & REASON: RELIGION & CIVIC
LIFE IN THE NEW NATION (1996):
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ed any official or fixed formulation of these principles, for no public credo
was to be established by law. So it is more than just a little ironic that the
nation's most cherished human rights depend upon the continued private faith
of innumerable Americans in creeds and confessions that themselves cannot
be officially adopted by the Republic, lest the adoption run afoul of the pro-
hibition on laws respecting an establishment of religion. Yet, coming full
circle, it is this "no-establishment principle" that allows voluntary religion to
flourish, which in turn nurtures belief in God-endowed rights The resulting
The Founders eliminated the problem of dual allegiance to God and government by removing
God from the authority of the government....
This solution to the theological-political problem in theory, however, required a major
corollary to work in practice: a belief that church and state would agree on the moral basis of
political action .... Only if church and state can agree on the moral standard for political action
can [subjugation of religion to state or vice versa] be avoided. In other words, reason (the operat-
ing principle of civil government) and revelation (the ultimate standard for religion) must concur
on the moral law for the Founders' solution to work.
The Founders, of course, agreed with this proposition .... This conceit that reason and
revelation agree on the moral law so permeated the Founding em that the modem reader may
miss it because authors of the period more often assumed this proposition than demonstrated it.
When citing authority for fundamental propositions, writers of the Founding era appealed to both
reason and revelation as a matter of course.
Id. at 74-75.
2 See, for example, James Madison's letter wherein he observes how the Virginia churches had great-
ly expanded in number and reputation since disestablishment. Letter to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822),
in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 273.
276 (1865) ("[in] Virginia ... religion prevails with more zeal and a more exemplary priesthood than it
ever did when established .... Religion flourishes in greater purity without, than with the aid of Govern-
ment").
That keenest of observers, Alexis de Tocqueville, sketched this delicate balance in operation during
his visits to the America of the 1830s:
Religion, which never intervenes directly in the government of American society,
should ... be considered as the first of their political institutions ....
I do not know if all Americans have faith in their religion-for who can read the secrets
of the heart?-but I am sure that they think it necessary to the maintenance of republican institu-
tions. That is not the view of one class or party among the citizens, but of the whole nation; it is
found in all ranks.
For the Americans the ideals of Christianity and liberty are so completely mingled that it
is almost impossible to get them to conceive of the one without the other ....
The religious atmosphere of the country was the first thing that struck me on arrival in the
United States. The longer I stayed in the country, the more conscious I became of the important
political consequences resulting from this novel situation.
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juggling act is what Dr. Os Guinness aptly describes as the still "undecided
experiment in freedom, a gravity-defying gamble that stands or falls on the
dynamism and endurance of [the Republic's] unofficial faiths."3
This ongoing experiment in human liberty, because of its indeterminacy,
has had the unforeseen effect of concentrating intense pressure on a single
constitutional restraint on governmental power, namely the Establishment
Clause. To the uninitiated, having the cause of this pressure pinpointed goes
far toward explaining why the no-establishment principle has become one of
the chief battle sites over who exercises cultural authority in this nation.4
Quite simply, the Establishment Clause has become where Americans litigate
over the meaning of America.' Thus, it is to the Establishment Clause that
we rightly devote so much of our attention and energy.
The United States Supreme Court's modem jurisprudence concerning
church/state relations is commonly dated from its 1947 decision in Everson v.
Board of Education,6 which embraced a separationist interpretation of the
Establishment Clause. Since Everson, the Court begins with separatistic as-
In France I had seen the spirits of religion and of freedom almost always marching in
opposite directions. In America I found them intimately linked together in joint reign over the
same land.
My longing to understand the reason for this phenomenon increased daily. To find this
out, I questioned the faithful of all communions .... I found that [American Catholic priests]
all ... thought that the main reason for the quiet sway of religion over their country was the
complete separation of church and state. I have no hesitation in stating that throughout my stay in
America I met nobody, lay or cleric, who did not agree about that.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 269-72 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lemer, eds., Harper &
Row 1966).
1OS GUINNESS. THE AMERICAN HOUR: A TIME OF RECKONING AND THE ONCE AND FUTURE ROLE
OF FAITH 18-19 (1993).
' See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO
DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
' Some have puzzled as to why broad coalitions, like that behind the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994). can come together over the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause but not the Establishment Clause. The Free Exercise Clause is about protecting religiously
informed conscience, especially freedom for religious minorities to continue practices that are out of step
with the general culture. Most everyone who cares about religion agrees on the desirability of protecting
these matters. This is not the case, however, with the Establishment Clause. Where the stakes are high, as in
the culture wars, there can be little coalition building between social liberals and social conservatives or
between theological liberals and theological conservatives.
330 U.S. 1 (1947). While narrowly upholding a state law permitting local authorities to reimburse
parents for the cost of transporting children to school, including church-related institutions, the rhetoric and
historical method adopted by the Court in Everson were separatistic.
1997]
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sumptions when addressing novel questions that invoke the no-establishment
principle. The separationism theory has become so dominant that today, fifty
years after Everson, courts assume a need to justify holdings that reach results
not easily fitting into Jefferson's influential metaphor ("a wall of separation")
as allowable departures from the rule first laid down in Everson.
This Article will refer to separationism as based on "older assumptions."
The Court's presuppositions concerning the nature and contemporary value of
religion and the proper role of modem government underlie what will be
referred to as a "traditional analysis" of the case law. Part I is a partial over-
view of the Supreme Court's cases since Everson, and has the goal of making
the strongest arguments-within the framework of separationism-for the
constitutionality of governmental welfare programs that permit participation
by faith-based social service providers.
Part II is about separationism's major competitor, a theory centered on the
unleashing of personal liberty to the end that, with minimal governmental
interference, individuals make their own religious choices. This theory has
come to be called the neutrality principle.7 Neutrality theory surfaced most
obviously in 1981 when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the
free speech and religion case of Widmar v. Vincent.! Religious neutrality as a
model for interpreting the Establishment Clause is based on what will be
termed "new assumptions." The aim of the new assumptions is to minimize
the effects of governmental action on individual or group choices9 concern-
ing religious belief and practice. When the dispute is over a welfare program
' See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2528 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (contrasting the "neutrality principle" with the "funding prohibition" view of the
Establishment Clause); Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704 (1994) ("[T]he [neutral-
ity] principle is well grounded in our case law, as we have frequently relied explicitly on the general
availability of any benefit provided religous groups or individuals in turning aside Establishment Clause
challenges."). Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 624 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (characterizing a
social service program open to a diverse array of organizations neutral as to religious and nonreligious appli-
cants).
. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). WVidmar held that the Free Speech Clause, with its requirement that there be
no content-based discrimination, is not overridden by the Establishment Clause. Id. at 271-75. Accordingly,
a state university was prohibited from denying a student religious organization the same access to facilities
provided to other student organizations, thereby permitting the students to meet, pray, sing, and worship on
campus.
Religious choices by an individual believer or by a religious group are not differentiated in this
Article. Individual rights are akin to the group rights of a church or religious denomination as long as the
organization can show injury-in-fact to the purposes or activities of the group itself, or when the organiza-
tion has third-party standing to assert a rights claim on behalf of its members pursuant to the three-part test
set out in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
[Vol. 46
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in which faith-based social service providers desire to participate, the neutrali-
ty principle requires government to follow a rule of minimizing the impact of
its actions on religion, to wit: all service providers may participate in a wel-
fare program without regard to religion and free of eligibility criteria that
require the abandonment of a provider's religious expression or character.
Thus, Part II consists of a realignment of the Supreme Court's cases along a
new axis, with the goal of making the strongest arguments-within the frame-
work of these new assumptions-for the constitutionality of governmental
programs of aid which permit full and equal participation by faith-based so-
cial service providers.
Before turning to the case law, it should be stated candidly and up front
that there is no truly neutral position concerning these matters, for all models
of church/state relations embody substantive choices. The decisions the Su-
preme Court handed down in both Everson and Widmar are not otherwise.
Separationism is a value-laden judgment that certain areas of the human con-
dition best lie within the province of religion, while other areas of life are
properly under the authority of civil government. Separationism, this most
dominant of theories, is in no sense the inevitable product of objective reason
unadulterated by an ideological commitment to some higher point of refer-
ence. Separationism cannot stand outside of the political and religious milieu
from which it emerged and honestly claim to be neutral concerning the nature
and contemporary value of religion or the purposes of modern government.
The same must be said for its primary competitor, the neutrality theory." In-
deed, to demand that any theory of church/state relations transcend its pedi-
gree or its presuppositions and be substantively neutral is to ask the impossi-
ble."
" The term "neutrality" can mislead readers into believing that the theory claims to be substantively
neutral. It is not. The theory is neutral only in the sense that government minimizes its role in influencing
the religious choices of its citizens, thereby leaving persons free to make these choices for themselves. Gov-
ernment does so, for example, by structuring its social welfare programs to give citizens wide choices, with
religious choices being among the available selections.
To further confuse matters, courts and commentators sometimes use "equal" as a substitute for "neu-
tral." See, e.g., STEPHEN V. MONSMA & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, EDS., EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN
A PLURALIST SOCIETY (forthcoming 1997). In this context, "neutrality" and "equality" are intended to con-
vey the same meaning.
Whether termed the "neutrality principle" or "equal-treatment review," the theory stakes out substan-
tive positions as to the nature and contemporary value of religion and the purposes of modem government.
The theory places a great deal of importance on the religious impulse in human nature. And the theory as-
signs to government a minimal role in directing religion, seeking to limit government to addressing the rea-
sonable regulatory needs for the protection of organized society.
" One of the conceits of modernism is that humankind acting alone, through reason and scientific
1997]
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I. OLDER ASSUMPTIONS: SEPARATIONISM AND A TRADITIONAL
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE LAW
The Supreme Court distinguishes between the direct 2 and the indirect 3
receipt of a government's welfare assistance by social service providers. "In-
direct" welfare assistance means that a personal choice by the ultimate benefi-
ciary-rather than by the government-determines which social service pro-
vider eventually receives the assistance. Indirect forms of assistance will be
discussed first because the current state of the case law is more easily sorted
out.
observation, can determine universal truths. In contrast, the Jewish and Christian traditions will test any such
'universals' against the special revelation of Scripture. Postmodemists, like observant Jews and traditional
Christians, dismiss the professed objectivity or claimed neutrality of modernists as arrogant pretensions.
Without embracing the rest of their philosophy, religionists can agree with postmodemists that human rea-
son-and hence one of its products, the positive law-is contingent on time, place, perception, and culture.
See generally STANLEY J. GRENz. A PRIMER ON POSTMODERNISM (1996): GENE EDWARD VEITH, JR.,
POSTMODERN TIMES: A CHRISTIAN GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT AND CULTURE (1994). Thus, when
engaging the church/state debate, observant Jews and traditional Christians may be disarmingly candid and
lose nothing in the bargain by conceding that there is no neutral theory concerning the proper interpretation
of the Establishment Clause. Rather, the question for Jews and Christians is to determine which theory of
church/state relations most nearly comports with the biblical image of life's purpose, as well as the proper
role of the political community.
Direct forms of assistance come not just as payments on specified-use grants or purchase-of-service
contracts, but in a variety of other forms as well: high-risk loans, low-interest loans, and government-guar-
anteed loans; tax-exempt low-interest bonds for capital improvements; insurance at favorable premiums; in-
kind donations of goods such as used furniture or surplus food; free use of government property, facilities,
or equipment; free assistance by government personnel to perform certain tasks; free instruction, consulta-
tion, or training by government personnel; and reduced postal rates. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CATALOG OF FED. DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE xv-xvi (29th ed. 1995).
The catalog lists and defines 15 types of federal assistance. As classified by the General Services Adminis-
tration. federal benefits and services are provided through seven categories of financial assistance (grants,
loans, insurance, donated property, etc.) and eight categories of nonfinancial assistance (training, counseling,
supplying technical literature, investigation of complaints, etc.). Id. See also Douglas J. Besharov, Bottom-
up Funding, in To EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 124 (Michael Novak ed., 2d ed.
1996) (comparing the strengths and weaknesses that arise when funding comes directly and indirectly from
government).
" Indirect forms of assistance include: individual income tax credits and deductions; student scholar-
ships, fellowships, and guaranteed loans; and educational vouchers and federal child care certificates.
Indirect assistance can be further divided. Vouchers and scholarships, for example, are types of indi-
rect aid where the immediate source of the benefit is the government. On the other hand, indirect benefits
such as tax credits and deductions are examples of so called "bottom-up" aid, in which the immediate source
of aid is private. The government's role in connection with this second type of indirect assistance is to facili-
tate the flow of aid by rewarding the private source after the fact. The distinction between these two types of
indirect assistance may enter into certain policy debates and decisions made by legislators. However, the
Supreme Court has not made use of this distinction for purposes of interpreting the Establishment Clause.
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The Court has consistently held that government may design a welfare
program that places benefits in the hands of individuals, who in turn have
freedom in the choice of service provider to which they take their benefits
and "spend" them. It makes no difference whether the chosen provider is
governmental or independent, secular or religious. Any aid to religion as a
consequence of such a program only indirectly reaches-and thereby only
indirectly advances-the religion of a faith-based provider. In situations of
indirect assistance, the equal treatment of religion-not separationism-is the
Court's operative rule for interpreting the Establishment Clause. As will be
shown below, this rule of equality is instrumental to neutrality theory. 4
The leading cases are Mueller v. Allen,'5 Witters v. Washington Depart-
ment of Services for the Blind,6 and most recently Zobrest v. Catalina Foot-
hills School District.' Even the more liberal Justices on the Court have ac-
ceded to the direct/indirect distinction. 8
The rationale for this distinction is twofold. First, the constitutionally sa-
lient cause of any indirect aid to religion is entirely in the control of inde-
pendent actors, not in the hands of the government. So long as individuals
may freely choose or not choose religion, merely enabling private decisions
logically cannot be a governmental establishment of religion. The government
is essentially passive as to the relevant decision, and hence not the agent of
any resulting religious use. Second, the indirect nature of the aid, channelled
as it is through countless individual beneficiaries, reduces church/state inter-
action and any resulting regulatory oversight. This enhances the
nonentanglement that is so desirable from the perspective of the Establish-
ment Clause.
See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
" 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding a state income tax deduction conferred on school parents to assist
in their children's tuition and other educational expenses).
" 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding a state vocational grant program to finance a blind individual's
training at a sectarian school to obtain a degree to enter a religious vocation).
" 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (providing an interpreter to a deaf student attending a parochial high school does
not violate the Establishment Clause). Even Everson v. Board of Educ.. 330 U.S. 1 (1947), which upheld a
state law allowing local governments to provide reimbursement to parents for the expense of transporting
their children by bus to school, including to parochial schools, can also be characterized as having sub-
scribed to this direct/indirect distinction.
" See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2541 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting, writing for himself and Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer) (acknowledging the rule applied
in Mueller Witters, and Zobrest).
1997]
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There are a number of familiar programs that illustrate this rule: individual
income tax deductions for contributions to charitable organizations, including
those that are religious; 9 the G.I. Bill 2° and other federal aid to students at-
tending the college or university of their choice, including those affiliated
with a church;21 federal child care certificates for low-income parents of pre-
school-age children; 22 and state-issued vouchers permitted under the Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families program. Pursuant to this rule of law,
vouchers given to welfare beneficiaries that are redeemable by any eligible
provider, whether governmental or independent, secular or religious, would
be constitutional.24
It bears emphasizing that the programs of aid upheld in Mueller, Witters,
and Zobrest were adopted as a matter of legislative discretion or prudence.
These cases do not hold that there is a constitutional right to equal treatment
between governmental and independent sector providers. Government may
° See 26 U.S.C. §§ 170, 501(c)(3) (1994).
2o 38 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3243 (1994).
"- See, e.g., Federal Pell Grants, 20 U.S.C. § 1070a (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 690.78. An eligible student
for a Pell grant is defined in 20 U.S.C. § 1091 (1994). Students may utilize their grant at an institution of
higher education (§ 1088) or other eligible institution (§ 1094). Church-affiliated colleges and universities
are not excluded.
-2 The Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9858-9858q (Supp.
1996). The Act allows parents receiving child care certificates from the government to obtain child care at a
center operated by a church or other religious organization, including a pervasively sectarian center. Id. at
§§ 9858n(2), 9858k(a), 9858c(c)(2)(A)(i)(1).
23 See § 1040) of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. 42
U.S.C. § 604a (1996 Supp.). Section 104 is known by the popular name of "Charitable Choice." Charitable
Choice permits states to involve faith-based providers in the delivery of welfare services funded by the fed-
eral government through block grants to the states. Where the form of the assistance is indirect, such as by
means of certificates or vouchers, the faith-based providers are not restricted as to their religious activities.
2 To be sure, care must be exercised in the design of the welfare program. If only voluntary sector
providers are eligible and if most of these providers are faith-based, then the case law may support overturn-
ing the program as having a primary religious effect. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973) (striking down a state educational program that was designed to aid only nonpublic schools);
Similar to Nquisi is Sloan v. Lemon. 413 U.S. 825, 833-35 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a state tuition
reimbursement plan available only to parents of nonpublic school students).
Because the plan in Nrquist excluded government schools, Nrquist is distinguishable from Mueller
Witters, and Zobrest. See Durham v. McLeod, 192 S.E.2d 202 (S.C. 1972), dismissed for want ofa substan-
tialfederal question, 413 U.S. 902 (1973) (decided on the same day the Court decided Nyvquist). In Durham,
the state court had upheld a student loan program wherein students could attend the college of their choice,
religious or nonreligious. The Supreme Court apparently approved. Likewise, the Court in Nyquist said that
educational assistance provisions such as the G.I. Bill do not violate the Establishment Clause even when
some GIs choose to attend church-affiliated colleges. 413 U.S. at 782 n.38 (leaving open the option of
"some form of public assistance (e.g., scholarships) made available generally without regard to the see-
tarian/nonsectarian, or public/nonpublic nature of the institution benefited").
HeinOnline  -- 46 Emory L. J. 8 1997
1997] FAITH-BASED SERVICE PROVIDERS
decide that these indirect benefits are redeemable at its welfare agencies
alone, ' thereby excluding all similarly situated independent sector providers.
Should a state decide to provide assistance only through government-operated
agencies, it can do so without violating the First Amendment. The caveat is
that a state cannot adopt a program of aid that involves all providers of wel-
fare services, governmental and independent sectors, but specifically disquali-
fies participation by religious providers. The Free Exercise Clause prohibits
any such intentional discrimination against religion.26
Unlike indirect forms 'of assistance, when it comes to direct assis-
tance-that is, a government's general program of assistance flows directly to
all organizations, including faith-based providers of services-then
separationism is the Court's beginning frame of reference. Separationism
makes three assumptions. First, it assumes that a sacred/secular dichotomy
accurately describes the world of religion and the work of faith-based pro-
viders called to minister among the poor and needy. That is to say, the activi-
ties of faith-based providers can be separated into the temporal and the spiri-
tual. This assumption, of course, is vigorously challenged by neutrality
theorists. Second, separatists assume that religion is private and that it
should not involve itself with public matters, with "public" often equated to
"political" or "governmental" affairs. The neutrality principle rejects this
2. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 16
(1947) (dictum), Brusca v. State Bd. of Educ., 332 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1971), affd nern., 405 U.S.
1050 (1972).
2' Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618 (1978).
Should such a case ever arise, separationists will argue that there is a compelling interest in overrid-
ing the Free Exercise Clause, namely the "no aid" interpretation of the Establishment Clause. There are no
Supreme Court cases on this precise point. However, the recent case of Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the Univ. of Va.. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995), did uphold direct aid to a publication with an overtly religious
viewpoint. The Establishment Clause was found not to prohibit the direct funding. Hence, compliance with
the Clause was not a compelling governmental interest. See infra notes 112-30 and accompanying text.
A recent case in the Sixth Circuit, citing Church of the Lukumi, held that the U.S. Army violated the
Free Exercise Clause when it excluded religious but not secular child care providers from operating on its
bases and receiving various direct benefits. Hartman v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973 (6th Cir. 1995). The appeals
court went on to hold that the governmental assistance did not advance or endorse religion in violation of
the Establishment Clause. In all respects. Hartman appears to have correctly applied Supreme Court prece-
dent.
2, The Court has constructed a society in which faith-based providers deliver their welfare services
within discrete and clearly defined boundaries easily segregated from the provider's religious beliefs and
practices. For a thorough debunking of the Court's sacred/secular dichotomy, see Laura Underkuffler-
Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular. A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment
Theor, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837 (1995).
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private/public dichotomy as well, insisting that personal faith has public con-
sequences and that the practice of religious faith can lead to cooperation with
the government in achieving laudable public purposes.2" Third, separatists
assume that a government's welfare assistance equates to aid for the service
provider. Neutrality theories contest this characterization as well, describing
the situation as one of cooperation between government and independent
sector providers, with the joint aim being society's betterment through the
delivery of aid to the ultimate beneficiaries.29
As a general proposition, the Supreme Court has said that direct forms of
reimbursement can be provided for the "secular" services offered by a reli-
gious organization but not for those services comprising the group's "reli-
gious" practices. Thus, if an organization's secular and religious functions are
reliably separable, direct assistance can be provided for the secular functions
alone. But if they are not separable, then the Court disallows the assistance
altogether, with the explanation that the Establishment Clause will not allow
the risk3" of governmental aid furthering the transmission of religious beliefs
or practices.
The juridical category the Court utilizes to determine whether a general
program of direct assistance risks advancing religion is whether the provider
is "pervasively sectarian."'" Should the provider fit the profile of a perva-
' In neutrality theory, the activities of"government" do not monopolize the "public." At present-as
well as historically-faith-based charities comprise a large number of the available voluntary sector social
service providers, and they operate many of the most efficient and successful programs. As long as the
government's welfare program furthers the public purpose of society's betterment-that is, helping the poor
and the needy-it is neutral as to religion if the program involves faith-based providers on an equal basis
with all others.
- In neutrality theory, the independent sector providers of social services who opt to participate in a
government's welfare program are not in any primary sense "beneficiaries" of the government's assistance.
Because they deliver services to those in need, faith-based providers give far more in value measured by so-
cietal betterment than they could possibly receive as an incident of their expanded responsibilities.
" The Court has not always required proof of actual advancement of religion. In certain instances, the
mere presence of such a risk or hazard has been sufficient to strike down the aid program. See Grand Rapids
Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385, 387 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349. 370, 372 (1975); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 474. 480 (1973); cf
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 610-12 (1988).
" The meaning of the term "pervasively sectarian" can be gleaned from the cases. In Roenrer v. Board
of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 758 (1976) (plurality opinion), the Court turned back a challenge to a state
program awarding noncategorical grants to colleges, including sectarian institutions that offered more than
just seminarian degrees. In discussion focused on the fostering of religion, the Court said:
[Tihe primary-effect question is the substantive one of what private educational activities,
by whatever procedure, may be supported by state funds. Hunt [v. McNair 413 U.S. 734 (1973)]
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sively sectarian organization, then separationist theory prohibits any direct aid
to the provider. The one small exception is aid that, due to its form or nature,
cannot be converted to a religious use. For example, the Court has allowed
independent religious schools to receive government-provided secular text-
books and bus transportation between a student's home and school.32
All the Supreme Court's cases striking down direct programs of aid have
involved primary and secondary faith-based schools.3 Contrariwise, in each
of the three instances that have come before the Court involving direct aid to
colleges and universities, including those which are faith-related, the Court
has upheld the financial aid. 4 The Court has received considerable criti-
cism--even ridicule-for the close distinctions it has made in religious school
cases between the types of permissible and impermissible aid. However, for
present purposes these distinctions are best seen as fact-finding quibbles over
requires (I) that no state aid at all go to institutions that are so "pervasively sectarian" that secu-
lar activities cannot be separated from sectarian ones, and (2) that if secular activities can be sep-
arated out, they alone may be funded.
426 U.S. at 755. The Roman Catholic colleges in Roemer were held not to be pervasively sectarian. The
record supported findings that the institutions employed chaplains who held worship services on campus,
taught mandatory religious classes, and started some classes with prayer. However, there was a high degree
of autonomy from the Roman Catholic Church, the faculty was not hired on a religious basis and had com-
plete academic freedom except in religion classes, and students were chosen without regard to their religion.
A comparison of the colleges in Roemer with the elementary and secondary schools in Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 767-68 (1973), clarifies the term "pervasively sectarian." The
schools in Nyquist that were found to be pervasively sectarian placed religious restrictions on student admis-
sions and faculty appointments, enforced obedience to religious dogma, required attendance at religious
services, required religious or doctrinal study, were an integral part of the mission of the sponsoring church,
had religious indoctrination as a primary purpose, and imposed religious restrictions on how and what the
faculty could teach.
Although the definition of a pervasively sectarian institution has been stated in the foregoing general
terms, only church-affiliated primary and secondary schools have ever been found by the Supreme Court to
fit the profile. Presumably a church, synagogue, or mosque would also be regarded as pervasively sectarian
insofar as it performs sacerdotal functions.
'2 See. e.g.. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (subsidy
for state-prepared testing and recordkeeping required by law); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (up-
holding use of public personnel to provide guidance, remedial, and therapeutic speech and hearing services
at a neutral site; upholding provision of diagnostic services in the nonpublic school; upholding provision of
standardized tests and state scoring); Meek, 421 U.S. 349 (loan of secular textbooks); Board of Educ. v.
Allen. 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (secular textbooks).
" See Aguilar v. Felton. 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist., 473 U.S. 373; New York v.
Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977): Wolnan, 433 U.S. 229: Meek, 421 U.S. 349; Nyquist. 413 U.S.
756; Levitt, 413 U.S. 472; Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
' See Roemer, 426 U.S. 736; Hunt, 413 U.S. 734; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
HeinOnline  -- 46 Emory L. J. 11 1997
EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
whether the Court rightly determined if the nature of a particular direct bene-
fit can be converted to a religious and, therefore, forbidden use.
On the two occasions the Court has considered the constitutionality of
social service direct aid programs, it has sustained both programs. In a turn of
the century case, Bradfield v. Roberts,35 the Court upheld a capital
improvement grant for a church-affiliated hospital. 6 At present, however,
Bowen v. Kendrick7 is the modem and hence more pertinent case. By the
narrow margin of five to four, the Court in Kendrick upheld "on its face"
federal grants for teenage sexuality counseling, including counseling offered
by faith-related centers. However, the Court remanded for a case-by-case or
"as applied" review in order that teenage counseling centers found to be per-
vasively sectarian would have their grants discontinued."
Under the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA),"9 the Secretary of Health
and Human Services authorizes direct cash grants to both governmental and
independent sector nonprofit organizations doing research or providing ser-
175 U.S. 291 (1899).
In Bradfield, a corporation located in the District of Columbia known as Providence Hospital was
chartered in 1864 by act of Congress. The enabling act was facially neutral in that it made no mention of
religion, nor was the hospital ostensibly controlled by or associated with a church. Nevertheless, all the di-
rectors of the hospital and their successors were "members of a monastic order or sisterhood of the Roman
Catholic Church," and title to the real estate on which the hospital buildings were constructed was "vested in
the Sisters of Charity of Emmitsburg, Maryland." Id. at 297. Federal taxpayers challenged as violative of the
Establishment Clause an 1897 appropriation to build on the hospital grounds "an isolating building or ward
for the treatment of minor contagious diseases." that when completed was to be turned over to Providence
Hospital. Id. at 293. This arrangement, alleged plaintiffs, was an instance in which "public funds are being
used and pledged for the advancement and support of a private and sectarian corporation." Id. For consider-
ation of the question before it, the Court assumed, arguendo, that a capital appropriation to a religious cor-
poration would violate the Establishment Clause. The Court said plaintiffs' allegations nonetheless failed to
show that Providence Hospital was a religious or sectarian body. Merely because the board of directors was
composed entirely of members of the same religion did not make the hospital religious. Without additional
evidence, the Court was unwilling to assume that Providence Hospital would act otherwise than in accord
with its legal charter, in which its powers by all appearances were secular, having to do with the care of the
injured and infirm. Although plaintiffs alleged that the hospital's business was "conducted under the auspices
of the Roman Catholic Church," there was no evidence that management of the business was limited to
members of that faith or that patients had to be Catholic. Id. at 298-99.
Bradfield turned on the inadequacies of plaintiffs' pleading and evidence. The Court also had a for-
malistic view of the importance of separate incorporation by means of a facially neutral charter, notwith-
standing that the corporation had a de facto interlocking directorate with a religious order. Accordingly,
although the bottom-line result in Bradfield was counter to a no-aid vie"; of the Establishment Clause, the
Court utilized a separatistic framework for its analysis.
'7 487 U.S. 589 (1994).
" Id. at 600-02, 622.
42 U.S.C. §§ 300z to 300z-10 (1994).
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vices in the areas of teenage pregnancy and counseling for adolescents con-
cerning premarital sexual relations. Accordingly, the societal problems ad-
dressed by AFLA are a blend of health, economic, and moral issues sur-
rounding teenage sexuality and out-of-wedlock pregnancy. The statute defines
an eligible grant recipient as a "public or non-profit private organization or
agency," apparently permitting otherwise qualified religious organizations to
receive the grants on the same terms as nonreligious agencies.4" Moreover,
language in the Act expressly invites participation by religious organizations
and requires certain secular grantees to take into account involvement by
religious organizations, along with family and community volunteer groups,
in addressing the problem of adolescent sexuality. These provisions were
written into the law to ensure that religious groups would be treated in a non-
discriminatory manner when compared with other similarly situated eligible
grant recipients. No statutory language specifically barred the use of grant
monies for worship, prayer, or other intrinsically religious activities. Finally,
other than routine fiscal accountability to ensure that federal funds were not
misappropriated, no monitoring or other oversight was made part of the re-
sulting relationship between the Department of Health and Human Services
and the participating religious organizations.4"
After describing the broad outlines of AFLA, the majority spoke in sweep-
ing terms of the Establishment Clause and governmental aid as permitting an
equality-based rule. It said that "religious institutions need not be quarantined
from public benefits that are neutrally available to all,"43 and that "this Court
has never held that religious institutions are disabled by the First Amendment
from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare programs."" The
Court then went on to utilize the three-prong Lemon test for its analysis.4S
Concerning Lemon's first prong, requiring that legislation have a secular
purpose, the contending parties in Kendrick agreed "that, on the whole, reli-
gious concerns were not the sole motivation behind the Act."46 As usual, the
Court's application of the purpose test was highly deferential to the legisla-
ture.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 593, 608-09.
' Id. at 595-96, 605-07.
I" d. at 614-15.
Id. at 608 (quoting Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 746 (1976)).
" Id. at 609.
" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
" Kendfick, 487 U.S. at 602-03.
1997]
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Lemon's second prong requires that the principal or primary effect of a law
not advance religion. There was nothing "inherently religious" or "specifically
religious," pointed out the Court, about the activities or social services pro-
vided by the grantees to adolescents with premarital sexuality questions and
problems.47 Moreover, simply because AFLA expressly required religious
organizations to be considered among the available grantees and demanded
that the role of religion be taken into account by secular grantees, that did not
have the effect of endorsing a religious view of how to solve the problem.48
As to grantee eligibility, the Court interpreted AFLA as "religion-blind" when
Congress required that all organizations, secular and religious, be considered
on an equal footing. Further, the legislation did not violate the Establishment
Clause merely because religious beliefs and the moral values urged by AFLA
overlap.49 Critical to the result was that the majority refused to hold that
faith-based teenage counseling centers were necessarily pervasively sectari-
an.5" Although the form of the assistance was a direct cash grant, the First
Amendment was not offended as long as the grantee was not pervasively
sectarian." The fact that the ultimate beneficiaries were impressionable ado-
lescents did not, without more, present an unacceptable risk that the no-estab-
lishment principle was violated. 2 Although AFLA did not expressly bar the
use of federal funds for worship, prayer, or other inherently religious activi-
ties, the Court said no explicit bar was required. The Court added, however,
that "[c]learly, if there were such a provision in this statute, it would be easi-
er to conclude that the statute on its face" was constitutional.53
Under the third prong of Lemon, the Court considers whether the statute in
question fosters an excessive administrative entanglement between religious
officials and the offices of government. Monitoring of AFLA grantees by the
Department of Health and Human Services is necessary only to ensure that
federal money is not misappropriated. There is no requirement that faith-
based grantees follow any federal guidelines concerning the content of the
advice given to teenagers or otherwise modify their programs. There are no
nondiscrimination requirements as to the beneficiaries served. Because reli-
gious grantees are not necessarily pervasively sectarian, the majority conclud-
k M. at 604-05, 613.
4' Id. at 605-06.
41 Id. at 606-07.
M. at 610-11.
" Id. at 606, 608.
'" Id. at 611-12.
" Id. at 614.
[Vol. 46
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ed that this limited oversight by the federal agency could not be deemed ex-
cessively entangling."
Dividing the analysis between "facial" and "as applied" components places
a considerable burden on separationists, like the legal activists behind the
Kendrick litigation, who rove the country filing suits claiming Establishment
Clause transgressions. The aim of these activists is to halt the governmental
aid, not on a piecemeal or case-by-case basis, but by enjoining the entire Act
insofar as it allows any participation by faith-based providers. This was possi-
ble when the Court was willing to overturn legislation on the mere "risk" that
the second or third prongs of Lemon were violated."S After Kendrick, a vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause must be proved in each case by palpable
evidence that confessional religion is being advanced. The only exception
occurs when the entire class of religious service providers is pervasively sec-
tarian. Because not all faith-based social service providers are pervasively
sectarian, a facial attack will fail.
In a short concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor drew a helpful distinction.
She noted that the object of congressional funding under AFLA, namely the
moral issue of teenage sexuality, was "inevitably more difficult than in other
projects, such as ministering to the poor and the sick."56 Far easier cases, she
opined, would be welfare programs funding faith-based soup kitchens or
hospitals. 7 Accordingly, where the object of the governmental aid is clearly
addressed to temporal needs (e.g., food, clothing, shelter, health), in Justice
O'Connor's view, a social service program that includes religious providers is
facially constitutional."
For the Court to require officials to distinguish between "pervasively" and
"non-pervasively" sectarian organizations creates a fundamental inconsistency
within its own doctrine. The Court had earlier held in Larson v. Valente59
that the Establishment Clause requires that government not intentionally dis-
Id. at 615-17.
s' See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
" Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
' Id. Justice O'Connor went on to warn that evidence of a pattern or practice at HHS of disregarding
the concerns of the Establishment Clause on an as-applied basis would, in her view. warrant overturning the
entire AFLA. Id. at 623-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
" In making this distinction. Justice O'Connor utilized the sacred/secular dichotomy. See supra note
27. But the dichotomy results in AFLA's constitutionality. In fact, the presumption leads to the facial ap-
proval of all welfare programs that permit equal participation by faith-based providers.
" 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
1997]
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criminate among types of religions,' nor should government utilize classifi-
cations based on denominational or sectarian affiliation."' Moreover, in order
to distinguish between "pervasively" and "non-pervasively sectarian" orga-
nizations, as Kendrick requires, courts will become deeply entangled in the
religious character of these faith-based providers of social services. '2 The
Supreme Court, however, has said that whenever possible officials should
avoid making detailed inquiries into religious practices, or probing into the
significance of religious words and events.63
' Id. at 244. 246. See also Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268 (1951). Religious organizations most willing to conform to contemporary culture are less sectarian.
Conversely, those organizations more conservative in theology and that have resisted acculturation will inev-
itably appear to civil judges as more sectarian. To exclude from funding those groups that are more "sectari-
an" is to punish those religions which are countereultural while rewarding those groups willing to secularize.
A sociologist has identified the "pervasively sectarian" groups as "orthodox." and the "non-sectarians" as
religious "progressives." HUNTER, supra note 4, at 42.46. Hunter says the religious "orthodox" are devoted
"to an external, definable, and transcendent authority," whereas "progressives" "resymbolize historic faiths
according to the prevailing assumptions of contemporary life." Id. From the standpoint of wanting to mini-
mize governmental influence on private religious choices, it is hard to imagine a more detrimental rule than
for the Supreme Court to penalize the orthodox while rewarding the progressives.
" Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet. 512 U.S. 687, 702-07 (1994); see Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 246 n.23 (1982). The rationale, in part, is that the Court wants to avoid making affiliation with a
particular denomination or type of religious group more attractive. If this were not the law, then merely
affiliating with a particular religious group could result in a civil advantage or disadvantage.
'- One problem with the requirement of distinguishing between "pervasively" and "non-pervasively"
sectarian organizations is that the level of religiousness of faith-based social service providers is a matter of
degree, and there are multiple ways to measure religiousness. CARL H. ESBECK, THE REGULATION OF RELI-
GIOUS ORGANIZATIONS As RECIPIENTS OF GOVERNMENTAL ASSISTANCE 8-9 (1996). Most providers are
neither fully sectarian nor fully secularized. Any multifactor test the courts devise will end up favoring some
religions and prejudicing others. Sorting through the array of social service providers would be a veritable
briar patch and cause the judiciary to violate its own admonitions concerning entanglement.
" See. e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. ofVa., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2524 (1995) (uni-
versity should avoid distinguishing between evangelism, on the one hand, and the expression of ideas merely
approved by a given religion on the other); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336
(1987), and id. at 34445 (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing a problem when the government attempts to
divine which jobs are sufficiently related to the core of a religious organization as to merit exemption from
statutory duties), Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983) (avoiding potentially
entangling inquiry into religious practice is desirable); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 n.6, 272
n.1 1 (1981) (holding that inquiries into significance of religious words or events are to be avoided); Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (avoiding entanglement that would follow should tax authorities
evaluate the temporal worth of religious social welfare programs is desirable). Likewise, in Jinn' Swaggart
Ministries v. California Bd. of Equalization. 493 U.S. 378, 396-98 (1990), and Texas Monthhi Inc. v. Bull-
ock. 489 U.S. 1, 20 (1989) (plurality opinion), the Court cautioned against unnecessarily making distinctions
between core religious practices (e.g.. worship, doctrinal teaching, distributing sacred literature) and those
activities of religious organizations that are more ancillary (e.g., operating a soup kitchen or hospital). For
similar reasons, courts are to avoid making a determination concerning the centrality of the belief or practice
in question to an overall religious system. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (rejecting free exercise test that "depend[s] on measuring the effects of a governmental
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Justice Kennedy, sensing analytical difficulty with Establishment Clause
doctrine whose application requires the Court to discriminate among religious
groups, wrote a brief concurring opinion.'M Stating that he doubted whether
"the term 'pervasively sectarian' is a well-founded juridical category,"6 Jus-
tice Kennedy went on to adopt a neutrality-based rule. A social assistance
program would be facially constitutional, Kennedy said, as long as its purpose
was neutral as to religion and a diverse array of organizations were eligible to
participate." Upon remand of the case, for Justice Kennedy the "question in
an as-applied challenge is not whether the entity is of a religious character,
but how it spends its grant."67 As long as the grant is actually used for the
designated public purpose-rather than to advance inherently religious beliefs
or practices-there is no violation of the Establishment Clause.68 This pro-
posal has the virtue of not violating the rule set down in Larson.
In laying down its rules concerning programs of direct assistance, the Su-
preme Court has adopted a funds-tracing analysis rather than a freed-funds
analysis. That is, the Court interprets the Establishment Clause as forbidding
the direct flow of taxpayer funds, as such, to pay for inherently religious
activities. The Court does not concern itself when governmental funding of a
faith-based provider's secular activities thereby frees private dollars to spend
on religious activities. In a pervasively sectarian organization, however, in
which the mixing of religious and secular activities is complete, the tracing of
taxpayer funds will always determine that religious activities are advanced in
tandem with the secular. Hence, in a pervasively sectarian organization even a
funds-tracing analysis causes the Court to hold that no taxpayer funds can go
directly to such organizations.
action on a religious objector's spiritual development"); United States v. Lee. 455 U.S. 252. 257 (1982)
(rejecting government's argument that free exercise claim does not lie unless "payment of social security
taxes will ... threaten the integrity of the Amish religious belief or observance"); Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) (holding that it is not within the judicial function or competence to resolve
religious differences); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990).
Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 624-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined by
Justice Scalia.
Id. at 624 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 624-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy's opinion is closest to the view of neutrality theorists. But he too falls short. Jus-
tice Kennedy would trace the government's funds and disallow any use for the advancement of religion. The
neutrality principle, as will be discussed below, infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text, requires only that
the Court examine the outcome of the welfare program with an eye to determining whether the public pur-
pose is being served by the social service provider. If so, then the judicial inquiry is at an end, for the gov-
ernment has received full "secular" value in exchange for taxpayer funds.
1997]
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The harm that separationists fear is not that privately raised dollars are
freed as a consequence of the government's program so that they may be
reallocated to a religious use. Rather, the feared harm is that governmental
monies (collected as taxes, user fees, fines, sale of government property,
etc.),69 may be used to pay for such inherently religious activities as wor-
ship, prayer, proselytizing, doctrinal teaching, and devotional scriptural read-
ing. Indeed, separationists on the Court have been most insistent that the
Establishment Clause "absolutely prohibit[s] government-financed or govern-
ment-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular religious
faith.
70
Although it will scandalize separationists, the rest of us are led to probe
below the bluff and bluster and ask the following: "Is the harm resulting from
government-collected monies going to religion so self-evident and severe?"
As citizens we are taxed to support all manner of policies and programs with
which we disagree. Tax dollars pay for weapons of mass destruction that
some believe are evil. Taxes pay for abortions and the execution of capital
offenders, that some believe are acts of murder. Taxes pay the salaries of
public officials whose policies we despise and oppose at every opportunity.
Why is religion different? If the answer is that we are protecting a religiously
informed conscientious right not to have one's taxes go toward the support of
religion, the Supreme Court has already rejected such a claim.' It makes no
difference to the Court that a taxpayer avers that he or she is "coerced" or
otherwise "offended" when general tax revenues are used in a program that
involves faith-based social service providers. 2 Accordingly, with reference
"' There is no dispute between separationists and neutrality theorists over whether the Establishment
Clause prohibits a tax or user fee earmarked for a religious purpose. It clearly does. See inf!'a note 127 and
accompanying text. What is disputed is whether monies collect by general taxation and appropriated to sup-
port a welfare program that does not discriminate against the participation of faith-based social service pro-
viders is constitutional. See infixa notes 131-45 and accompanying text.
" Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985).
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (rejecting claim by taxpayers challenging use of
revenues for funding of a state program to assist institutions of higher education, including church-affiliated
colleges): cf United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (requiring Amish employer to pay Social Secu-
rity tax in violation of his religious beliefs); United States v. American Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7
(1974) (per curiam) (holding that Quakers facing federal income tax liability did not have free exercise
rights that overrode provision in anti-injunction act barring claimants from suing to enjoin government from
collecting tax). The Court has never recognized a free exercise right to object when revenues raised by gen-
eral taxation are used to assist the poor or needy by involving faith-based providers in the delivery of wel-
fare services.
' The Court has recognized a strong protection of religious conscience found in the Free Speech
Clause. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977) (sustaining claim by Jehovah's Witness chal-
[Vol. 46
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to the Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause, it must again be
asked, "Is the harm that separationists would have us avoid at all cost so self-
evident and severe?"
Although a thorough treatment of this question is beyond the scope of this
Article, the answer separationists give is that there are two such harms which
the Establishment Clause is designed to safeguard against, and history demon-
strates that they can be quite severe: first, divisiveness within the body politic
along sectarian lines;73 and, second, the damage to religion itself by the un-
dermining of religious voluntarism and the weakening of church autonomy.74
lenging state requirement that motor vehicle license plate bear the motto "Live Free or Die" was violative of
freedom of thought, which includes the "right to refrain from speaking at all"); West Virginia v. Bamette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (public school compulsory flag salute and pledge of allegiance "invades the sphere
of intellect and spirit"); see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) ("Freedom of thought,
which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men."). But such protection does not
extend to taxpayers objecting to the monies being paid to faith-based organizations.
" See, e.g., John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
IsSuEs 275, 280-82 (1996) (identifying liberal arguments for church/state separation as. inter alia. the pro-
tection of society from political strife); Douglas Laycock. Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LE-
GAL IssuEs 313, 317 (1996) (one reason for no-establishment principle is to minimize the societal conflict
that attends use of governmental force to suppress religion); Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect
Liberty: A General Theoy of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 357. 360-62 (1996) (no-
establishment principle arose in response to the grave risk of political disharmony resulting from uncon-
trolled religious factionalism).
Typically the concem with religion dividing the body politic is buttressed by reference to European
religious wars, which were known to the founding generation, as well as by warnings that point to modem-
day Northern Ireland, Bosnia, or Lebanon. These are indeed events worthy of avoidance. But separationists
omit an obvious distinction between these instances of sectarian strife and the goal of neutrality theory. The
sectarian wars of medieval Europe were wars for religious monopoly. Each side sought to defeat the other
so as to establish its own religious hegemony. Neutrality theory has no such goal. Indeed, its goal is just the
opposite. If the neutrality principle were to be followed, then government's influence over religion would be
minimized and each individual's religious choices would be more fully enabled. See infra note 98 and ac-
companying text.
In their concem for preventing sectarian strife, an additional point overlooked by separationists is that
the Establishment Clause (indeed, the entire Bill of Rights) is a check on government-not a check on reli-
gion. Thus, the no-establishment principle guards against government's using its power inappropriately by
taking sides on behalf of a religion. Simply put, the Clause protects people from government. It does not
protect people from other people. It does not protect a minority religion from a majority religion. And it
does not protect the nonreligious from the religious. Separationists are prone to assume that religious ideolo-
gies are more intolerant and absolutist than secular ideologies; thus, they believe that the Establishment
Clause is there specifically to hold in check the excesses of religion. But it is only the excesses of govern-
ment that the Clause can check. See Douglas Laycock. Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious
Liberty. The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Centut', 80 MINN. L. REv. 1047, 1048, 1089-95,
1102 (1996). In the twentieth century, secular ideologies have proven every bit as violent as the
sectarianisms of the Middle Ages.
" The most compelling argument for a continued strict separation of church and state is the harm that
can befall religion itself when faith-based ministries become unduly involved with governmental programs
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Separationism has yet to give a convincing argument that these two harms
will befall the nation as a result of the equal involvement of faith-based pro-
viders in social service programs. The harm of sectarian divisiveness within
the body politic is not altogether different in kind or more threatening than
tax funding for other ideologies and programs that citizens find disagree-
able.75 And the harm to religion itself when too closely allied with govern-
ment, while real and threatening, can be adequately protected by writing into
the welfare legislation safeguards for protecting the religious character and
expression of faith-based providers.76
II. NEW ASSUMPTIONS: A PARADIGM SHIFT To
GOVERNMENTAL NEUTRALITY
Neutrality theory approaches the debate over the Establishment Clause from
an altogether different point of entry. According to this theory, when govern-
and benefits. Preserving the autonomy of religious providers is beyond the scope of this Article. This author
has touched briefly on the matter elsewhere. See ESBECK, supra note 62, at 47-51; Carl H. Esbeck. Religion
and a Neutral State: Imperative or Impossibility? 15 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 67, 80-83 (1984-85). Others
have also published on the topic. See. e.g., Besharov, supra note 12; Marvin Olasky. The Corruption of
Religious Charities, in To EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY ch. 8 (Michael Novak. ed.,
2d ed. 1996); Joe Loconte, The 7 Deadly Sins of Government Funding for Private Charities. POLICY REV.,
Mar./Apr. 1997; Amy L. Sherman, Cross Puiposes: Will Conservative Welfare Reform Cornpt Religious
Charities?, POLICY REV., Fall 1995. at 58-63; David Walsh, Irreducible. Inexplicable: The Effort to Carve
Out a Utilitarian. Public-Policy Role for Religion Strikes at the Core of Faith, WASH. POST, Mar. I, 1996,
at A] 7. Nonetheless, the available materials are few and anecdotal, and religious autonomy as an important
topic warrants more attention by scholars and judges alike.
" There was a time when the Supreme Court, in its interpretation of the Establishment Clause, sought
out political divisiveness along religious lines as a violation of the Clause. However, such evidence as a
separate element of Establishment Clause doctrine is now repudiated. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 n.17 (1987); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984); Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 403-04 n.1 1 (1983). The foregoing cases essentially rejected broad language in earlier cases.
See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 256 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 258-59
(Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 374-77 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
concurring and dissenting), Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (197 1). Political divisiveness analysis
was heavily criticized because it ran counter to the Court's recognition elsewhere that religious persons and
groups have full rights of free speech and political participation. See Edward M. Gaffney, Political Divisive-
ness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy. 24 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 205 (1980).
" An example of this is found in § 104 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 604a (1996 Supp.). Section 104. known by the popular name "Charitable
Choice," permits the involvement of faith-based providers in the delivery of welfare services funded by the
federal government through block grants to the states. For those faith-based providers that choose to partici-
pate, § 104(b), (d), and (f) set forth several rights of provider autonomy from excessive governmental regu-
lation.
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ment provides benefits to enable activities that serve the public good, such as
education, health care, or social services, there should be neither discrimina-
tion in eligibility based on religion, nor exclusionary criteria requiring these
charities to engage in self-censorship or otherwise water down their religious
identity as a condition for program participation.77 The neutrality model al-
lows individuals and religious groups to participate fully and equally with
their fellow citizens in America's public life, without being forced either to
shed or disguise their religious convictions or character. The theory is not a
call for preferential treatment for religion in the administration of publicly
funded programs.78 Rather, when it comes to participation in programs of
aid, neutrality merely lays claim to the same access to benefits, without re-
gard to religion, enjoyed by others.79 Finally, as noted above,8" the neu-
trality principle rejects the three assumptions made by separationist theory:
that the activities of faith-based charities are severable into "sacred" and
"secular" aspects, that religion is "private" whereas government monopolizes
" To these three requisites (a public purpose of social betterment, nondiscrimination, and religious au-
tonomy), neutrality theory adds the right of the ultimate beneficiaries to obtain their services from a nonreli-
gious provider if they have a sincere objection to a particular faith-based provider. See infra note 138 and
accompanying text.
" Some argue that the Establishment Clause, while prohibiting the establishment of a single national
religion, was nevertheless intended to allow Congress to support all religious denominations on a
nonpreferential basis. This is unlikely. When drafting the First Amendment the First Congress was almost
entirely negative concerning the Amendment's intent, i.e., the new central government was to have no au-
thority concerning religion. Hence, the Establishment Clause detailed what the new central government could
not do rather than what it could do. THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 198-222 (1986). The Supreme Court rejected
nonpreferentialism in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O'Connor J., concurring); id. at 113
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 612-18 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring);
Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 875 (1986). For arguments in support of nonpreferentialism, see Wallace, 472 U.S. at 98
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); ROBERT CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION (1988); MICHAEL MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978); Rodney K. Smith, Nonpreferentialism in Establishment Clause Analysis:
A Response to Professor Laycock. 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 245 (1991).
For present purposes it is important that the neutrality principle not be confused with
nonpreferentialism. The distinction is clearly drawn in Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2528-30 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
" Although the Supreme Court has never had before it a situation involving a direct program of aid
for religious organizations alone, obiter dicta in various cases suggest that any such program would be un-
constitutional. See Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702-07 (1994) (legislation favor-
ing one religious sect is unconstitutional); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (strik-
ing down state aid to private education the benefits of which went almost entirely to religious schools); cf.
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. at 394, 396 n.6, 398-99 (explaining and distinguishing Nyquist).
' See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
1997]
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"public" matters, and that governmental assistance paid to service providers is
aid to the providers as well as aid to the ultimate beneficiaries.
Should separationism eventually be dislodged from its place as the con-
trolling paradigm, it will be said that this change began in 1981 with the
Supreme Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincent." In Widmar, a state univer-
sity permitted student organizations to hold their meetings in campus
buildings when the facilities were not being used for other purposes. How-
ever, student religious organizations were specifically denied such access. The
university maintained that the denial was required because it could not sup-
port religion by providing meeting space for worship, prayer, and Bible
study, consistent with a no-aid interpretation of the Establishment Clause. A
group of students brought suit, first pointing out that the university had vol-
untarily created a limited public forum generally open to student expression.
Having dedicated the forum, the students argued that expression of religious
content could not be singled out for discrimination. A near-unanimous Su-
preme Court agreed. Most significantly, the Court held that the Establishment
Clause did not override the Free Speech Clause as long as the creation of the
forum had a secular purpose. Religious groups were just one of many student
organizations permitted into the forum. As long as the circumstances were
such that the university did not appear to be placing its power or prestige
behind the religious message, the Establishment Clause was not a problem. '2
The Widmar approach was soon dubbed "equal access," and in 1984 Con-
gress extended the same equality-based right to students enrolled in govern-
mental secondary schools.83 Following recent free speech victories in Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District," Capitol Square
Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette,5 and Rosenberger v. Rector and Vis-
itors of the University of Virginia,6 equal treatment has indeed become the
" 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
'- Id. at 271-74.
Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1994). The constitutionality of the Act was upheld in
the face of an Establishment Clause challenge in Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
508 U.S. 384 (1993) (disallowing viewpoint discrimination against a church that had sought to
show a film about family life in a forum otherwise open to that subject).
" 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995) (finding content-based discrimination in the refusal to permit a controversial
group to sponsor a religious display in a civic park). Because Pinette is illustrative of the current divisions
within the Court over separationism, the case is further discussed infra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
" 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (finding viewpoint discrimination in a public university's denial of printing
costs for a student publication postulating religious perspectives on current issues). Because Rosenberger
involved the Court in requiring a state university to finance a student publication that printed religious
(Vol. 46
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normative rule of law concerning private speech of religious content or
view-point." As discussed below, this equality-based rule is instrumental to
neutrality theory.88
Notwithstanding this unbroken line of victories for the equal treatment of
religion, it must be emphasized that in each case from Widmar to
Rosenberger, it was the Free Speech Clause that required nondiscrimination,
thereby supplying the victory. It remains to be explored below whether the
neutrality principle can make the transition from an equality right in free
speech to a right of equal participation in direct financial aid programs.89
Before continuing with the argument for neutrality theory based on the
most recent Supreme Court cases, a digression is necessary to address the
rationale for grounding the major competitor to separationism in the juridical
concept of governmental neutrality rather than equality. As it turns out, a rule
of equality works quite well when the church/state dispute is over access to
benefits.' However, when the Establishment Clause challenge is to legisla-
views-not just the provision of space in a public forum-the case is further discussed infra notes 112-30
and accompanying text.
" When the expression is not private speech but speech by government, then the controlling norm
remains a separationist model. This seems entirely proper. Government may neither confess inherently reli-
gious beliefs nor advocate that individuals profess such beliefs or observe such practices. Several cases illus-
trate this point. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down prayer in conjunction with com-
mencement ceremonies at a public junior high); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (disal-
lowing display of nativity scene inside courthouse, but upholding display of menorah outside public building
as part of larger holiday scene); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (striking down state law
requiring posting of Ten Commandments in public school classrooms); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968) (striking down state law prohibiting teaching theory of evolution in public schools) School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (disallowing devotional reading of Bible and recitation of Lord's Prayer in
public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (disallowing state requirement of daily classroom
prayer in public schools); and McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (disallowing program in
which local volunteers came to public school campus to teach religion).
Lynch v. Donnelliy. 465 U.S. 668 (1984), and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), are two aber-
rations. But Lynch and Marsh, while antiseparationist to be sure, are not based on equality either. Rather, in
their rationales, Lynch and Marsh are driven by a desire to cling to historical practices dating from a time
when America was less religiously plural.
See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
" A "benefit" means direct or indirect financial assistance for a public purpose. The benefit may be in
the form of a subsidy, grant, entitlement, loan, or insurance, as well as a tax credit or deduction.
A tax exemption, such as that upheld in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970), is to be
distinguished from tax credits and deductions. Credits and deductions are government benefits. A tax exemp-
tion, however, is the government's election to "leave religion where it found it," rather than the conferring
of a benefit. For First Amendment purposes a tax credit or deduction is little different from a direct grant or
cash payment. The idea that exemptions, credits, and deductions should all be regarded alike as "tax expen-
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tion that exempts religious organizations from regulatory burdens,9' the nor-
mative rule of law continues to follow a separationist model. Accordingly,
when the issue is relief from govemment-imposed burdens, religious groups
want to be viewed not as equal to others, but as separate and unique.
As a juridical concept, neutrality integrates into a single coherent theory
both (1) allowing religious providers equal access to benefits, and (2) allow-
ing them separate relief from regulatory burdens. The rationale entails distin-
guishing between burdens and benefits.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Establishment Clause is
not violated when government refrains from imposing a burden on religion,
even though that same burden is imposed on the nonreligious who are oth-
erwise similarly situated. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos' is the
leading case. Amos upheld an exemption for religious organizations in federal
civil rights legislation. The exemption permitted religious organizations to
discriminate on a religious basis in matters concerning employment. Finding
that the exemption did not violate the Establishment Clause, the Court ex-
plained that "it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define
and carry out their missions."'93 When the Court permits a legislature to ex-
ditures." while useful in other areas of fiscal policy, does not make sense in dealing with issues that arise
under the Establishment Clause. See DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES 11-13,
47-57 (1977): Boris I. Bittker, Churches. Tares and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969). Boris I.
Bittker & George K. Rahdert. The Exemption of Nonprofit Organi:ations from Federal Income Taxation. 85
YALE L.J. 299, 345 (1976).
' A "burden" means a regulation, a tax, or a criminal prohibition.
'- 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
" Id. at 335. See also Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 90 (1977) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (stating that constitutionality of labor law not placed in doubt simply because it requires religion
exemption); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (religious exemption from military draft for those
who oppose all war does not violate Establishment Clause); Wal:, 397 U.S. 664 (upholding property tax
exemptions for religious organizations). Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding release time
program for students to attend religious exercises off public school grounds); Selective Draft Law Cases,
245 U.S. 366 (1918) (upholding, inter alia. military service exemptions for clergy and theology students).
Estate ofThorton v. Caldor; Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), is not to the contrary. In Thortan, the Court
struck down a state law favoring Sabbath observance. However, as explained in Hohbie v. Unenploynent
Appeals Commission. 480 U.S. 136, 145 n.] I (1987). the Sabbath law was struck down because the state
cannot utilize classifications that single out a specific religious practice, thereby favoring that particular prac-
tice, as opposed to language inclusive of a general category of religious observances. For example, if Satur-
day as a day of rest is legislatively required to be accommodated by employers, all religious practices to be
excused (including all religious days of rest) must be required to be accommodated. If a kosher diet is re-
quired to be accommodated by commercial airlines, then all religious practices (including all religious di-
etary requirements) must be accommodated. If a student absence from school is excused for Good Friday,
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empt religion from regulatory burdens, it enables private religious choice.
The Court's rationale is twofold. First, to establish a religion connotes that
a government must take some affirmative step to achieve the prohibited re-
sult. Conversely, for government to passively "leave religion where it found
it" logically cannot be an act establishing a religion.' Referencing the First
Amendment's text, the words "shall make no law"9' imply the performance
of some affirmative act by government, not maintenance of the status quo.
Stating the practical sense of the matter, Professor Laycock observed that
"[t]he state does not support or establish religion by leaving it alone.""6 Sec-
ond, unlike benefit programs, religious exemptions reduce civic/religious
tensions and minimize church/state interactions, both matters that enhance the
nonentanglement so desired by the Establishment Clause.97
Should the Court in the future permit a legislature to design welfare pro-
grams that confer direct assistance without regard to religion, it would be
following a rule of equal treatment as to religion. However, exemptions from
burdens and equal treatment as to benefits have a common thread that ties the
then all absences for all religious holy days must be accommodated. Id.
The special needs of national defense make Gillette distinguishable from Thorton. In Gillette. Con-
gress was permitted to accommodate "all war" pacifists but not 'just war" inductees because to broaden the
exemption would invite increased church/state entanglements and would render almost impossible the fair
and uniform administration of the Selective Service System. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 450. The only decision that
does appear to be at odds with the principle followed in Amos and these other cases is Texas Monthly Inc.
v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion) (disallowing sales tax exemption for purchases of religious
literature).
,' The Court was most explicit in making the salient distinction between benefits and burdens in
Amos. Pointing out that it had previously upheld laws that helped religious groups advance their purposes,
the Court explained:
A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is
their very purpose .... [I]t must be fair to say that the government itselfhas advanced religion
through its own activities and influence.
[Tjhe Court ... has never indicated that statutes that give special consideration to reli-
gious groups are per se invalid.
483 U.S. at 337, 338.
" U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The Establishment Clause, in its entirety, provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ....
U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
' Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses. 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373,
1416 (1981).
" Walz, 397 U.S. at 676 (It is desirable when government refrains from imposing a burden on reli-
gion so as "to complement and reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the other.").
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two together. In following an equality-based rule as to benefits, equality is
not an end in itself but a means to a higher goal. That goal is the
minimization of the government's influence over personal choices concerning
religious beliefs and practices. The goal is realized when government is neu-
tral as to the religious choices of its citizens. Thus, whether pondering the
constitutionality of exemptions from regulatory burdens or of equal treatment
as to benefit programs, in both situations the integrating principle is
neutralizing the impact of governmental action on personal religious choic-
es.9" From that common axis, it makes sense to agree with the Court's hold-
ing, in cases such as Amos, that religious exemptions from legislative burdens
are consistent with the Establishment Clause, and, on the other hand, to insist
that the Establishment Clause permits the equal treatment of religion when it
comes to financial benefits."
" Unleashing personal religious choice as the core value of the Establishment Clause is not being
elevated here as good theology, just good jurisprudence. It is good jurisprudence because religious choice as
a core value allows each religion to flourish or die in accord with its own appeal. Choice as the controlling
legal standard maximizes liberty of both the individual and the religious community, while neutralizing the
impact of governmental action on religious life. In these respects it is biased toward a Western conception of
human rights and a limited state. This bias, however, is cause for neither surprise nor apology. It is the
Founders' legacy, and they were decidedly Western.
Good theology is another matter; for observant Jews and Christians, religious liberty consists not in
doing what we choose, but in the freedom to do what we ought. In Jewish and Christian orthodoxy, belief
and practice are understood in terms of truth, not choice. The point here is that it should not be troubling
that religious choice is the core value when interpreting the Establishment Clause. There is no reason that
law and theology must converge on this point. It is sufficient that law maximizes the individual's freedom to
pursue a direction indicated by his or her theology.
" In Dodge v. Salvation Army. 48 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9 38,619 (S.D. Miss. 1989), a strange case
with an unfortunate holding, a religious social service ministry dismissed an employee when it was discov-
ered she was a member of the Wiccan religion and was making unauthorized use of the office photocopy
machine to reproduce cultic materials. When the employee sued, claiming religious discrimination, the Sal-
vation Army invoked the "religious organization" exemption in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1994). The
employee countered that the Title VII exemption should not apply because her salary was substantially fund-
ed by a federal grant. The trial court agreed with the employee, holding that the Title VII exemption for
religious discrimination by a religious organization was unconstitutional on these facts. The trial court
thought the exemption advanced religion in a manner violative of the Establishment Clause when applied to
government-subsidized jobs. 48 Empl. Prac. Dec., at 55,409.
The holding in Dodge was a mistake. The trial court failed to observe the burden/benefit distinction
when it ran together the separate issues of benefits and burdens. The question of whether the Salvation Ar-
my may receive a direct benefit consonant with the Establishment Clause is controlled by Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). The answer to that question, whether "yes" or "no," is entirely independent
of the question of whether the Salvation Army may claim the Title VII exemption from the regulatory bur-
den of compliance with the civil rights law. The Court's decision in Amos holding that the Title VII exemp-
tion did not violate the Establishment Clause had already answered the second question in the affirmative.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327.
A better reasoned result, one contrary to Dodge. was reached by the federal court in Young v.
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It would be rhetorical, but still a fair comment, to say that in neutrality
theory religion gets the best of both worlds: religion is free of burdens borne
by others but shares equally in the benefits."ea However, this observation is
not an argument against the neutrality principle but a commendation of it. No
one need apologize for a model of church/state relations that maximizes reli-
gious liberty (subject, of course, to the reasonable demands of organized
society) and limits the power of the modem regulatory state. This combina-
tion of liberty and limits is what the First Amendment is about. It was the
First Amendment, after all, that expressly singled out religion as an attribute
of human nature that called for special treatment.
Previously mentioned were two cases handed down by the Court in late
June of 1995: Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, °'0 and
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia."° They
represent the Court's most recent pronouncements on the Establishment
Clause. Notably, the two newest appointees to the Court, Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer, were members of the Court by then and heard both cases.
The prima facie claim in both of these cases was that private religious
speech was denied equal access to a public forum, in violation of the Free
Speech Clause. The Court agreed. Further, in both cases the government
sought to justify its discriminatory treatment of religious speech as being
compelled by the Establishment Clause. A majority of the Justices rejected
Shawnee Mission Medical Center, No. CIV.A. 88-2321-3, 1988 LEXIS 12248 (D. Kan. Oct. 21, 1988) (re-
jecting argument that Seventh-day Adventist Hospital lost its Title VII exemption because it received federal
Medicare funding).
' Shifting the analysis from benefits to burdens does not mean moving the baseline from which the
neutrality of the government's action is measured. The baseline is not rooted in history or time, but in the
principle of minimizing government's impact on personal religious choice. As previously conceded, this
choice of baseline is not genuinely neutral. See supra notes 10-11. Thus, whether assessing the
constitutionality of a benefit or a burden, the location of the baseline is consistent, albeit not neutral.
This combination of receiving equal access to governmental benefits but being specially relieved of
burdens carried by others occurred in Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free School District, 85 F.3d 839 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 608 (1996). In -isu, a student religious club claimed the right to meet on the campus of a
public high school on the same basis as other noncurricular student organizations. The religious club had a
right to this benefit under a federal statutory law and the Free Speech Clause. However, when it came to its
selection of leaders, the school prohibited the club from selecting only Christians. The appeals court held
that as to officers with spiritual functions the club had a right to be relieved of the school's nondiscrimina-
tion requirement. Election of leaders sharing the same faith was essential to the club's self-definition, as well
as the maintenance of its associational character and continued expression as a Christian club. Id. at 856-62.
Logically, the same result would be reached under the Free Exercise Clause.
I0 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
"'. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
1997]
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this defense. Hence, the result in both cases is more consistent with a theory
of neutrality than of separationism.
In Pinette, the Ohio Ku Klux Klan sought a permit to place a display con-
sisting of a Latin cross in Capitol Square, a public area surrounding the state-
house. The square was otherwise open for private displays sponsored by a
variety of citizen groups. The State denied the permit, claiming that the cross
would be viewed as an endorsement of religion in violation of church/state
separation."°3
By a vote of seven to two the Court sided with the Klan. All of the Justices
in the majority believed that placement of the cross by a private group was
not barred by the Establishment Clause. However, these seven Justices gener-
ated four opinions, none of which commanded a five-vote majority concern-
ing the application of the Establishment Clause to these facts.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, believed that the exclusion of a private religious symbol from a
public forum could never be justified by the Establishment Clause. Long-
standing free speech doctrine required that there be no discrimination as to
content, and religious speech was not to be singled out for special scrutiny.
The mere fact that onlookers might view a religious display and mistake it
for the message of the state was no reason to suppress private speech. Rather,
the solution to the problem of the mistaken observer is not to suppress the
speech, but to correct the erroneous conclusion concerning the source of the
message. So long as the government treats all speakers equally and does noth-
ing to intentionally foster the onlooker's mistake, the government has done all
that the Establishment Clause requires."
Justice O'Connor wrote separately about the mistaken observer.' Ap-
plying an endorsement test, Justice O'Connor said that in some instances the
Establishment Clause imposed a duty on the state to take steps to disclaim
sponsorship of a private religious message." In her view, a government's
formal equality toward religion may not always be enough. In circumstances
OS Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2445.
'I ld. at 2447-50. Justice Thomas wrote separately stating his view that the content of the Klan's mes-
sage was political rather than religious. Id. at 2450-51 (Thomas, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 2455 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined by Justices Souter
and Breyer.
- Id. at 2452-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
[Vol. 46
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in which, for example, private religious messages "so dominate a public fo-
rum that a formal policy of equal access is transformed into a demonstration
of approval" in the eyes of an objective observer, the Establishment Clause
requires the state to take affirmative measures to see to it that religion is not
advanced."7
Justice Souter, joined by Justices O'Connor and Breyer, wrote separately
about the inadequacy of facial equality. Justice Souter agreed that equal treat-
ment of religion should narrowly prevail on these facts. However, this was
because his concem for the appearance of state endorsement of religion could
be remedied by requiring the affixing of a sign to the cross disclaiming offi-
cial sponsorship. Such a disclaimer, of course, would be required only when
the content of the speech is religious. Hence, the appropriate resonse, in Jus-
tice Souter's opinion, is not a facially neutral policy. Rather, the law ought to
respond to private religious speech as a "handle with care" item. In Justice
Souter's view, an access rule that is nondiscriminatory in purpose is required
of the state, but by itself is insufficient. "Effects matter to the Establishment
Clause."'' 8 The tone and content of Justice Souter's opinion left little doubt
that in his view church/state separation, rather than even-handed treatment, is
the dominant concern of the First Amendment.
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented in separate opinions. Justice
Stevens believed that the Establishment Clause created "a strong presumption
against the installation of unattended religious symbols on public proper-
ty., 09 Thus, in his view separationism subordinates the Free Speech Clause
and its rule of equal treatment.
Justice Ginsburg was even more extreme, articulating not a presumption
but an absolute rule of religious expulsion. She was of the opinion that "[i]f
the aim of the Establishment Clause is genuinely to uncouple government
from church," then "a State may not permit, and a court may not order, a
display of this character.""' As authority for this absolutist separationism,
Justice Ginsburg cited a law review article. The article is openly hostile to the
contributions of traditional religion and urges that it be driven out of the
public square."' It is deeply disturbing that Justice Ginsburg, in her first
'' Id. at 2454 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'= Id. at 2458-59 (Souter, J., concurring).
" Id. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 2475 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Deniocracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195, 197-214, 222
1997]
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opinion concerning religion as a Supreme Court Justice, would cite with ap-
proval this article with its brutish regard for religion and religious expression.
In Rosenberger,"' decided the same day as Pinette, a university-recog-
nized student organization published a newspaper known as Wide Awake. The
newspaper ran a number of stories on contemporary matters of interest to stu-
dents such as racism, homosexuality, eating disorders, and music reviews, all
from an unabashedly Christian perspective."' The university provided stu-
dent newspapers work space and paid the expenses of printing these publica-
tions. The printing costs were paid from a fund generated by a student activ-
ity fee.' The university refused to reimburse the cost of printing Wide
Awake. The refusal was pursuant to a policy disqualifying printing costs for
groups promoting "a particular belief in or about a deity or ultimate reali-
ty."" 5 The students sued, claiming this was yet another instance of discrim-
ination against private religious speech in violation of the Free Speech
Clause. The university sought to justify its discriminatory treatment as re-
quired by a no-aid interpretation of the Establishment Clause."6
By a vote of five to four, the Court ruled in favor of the students and di-
rected the university to treat Wide Awake the same as other student publica-
tions, without regard to the newspaper's religious perspective. Justice Kenne-
dy wrote the majority opinion, and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. Justice Kennedy determined that the
university had created a limited public forum for student expression on a
wide array of topics. "' Further, the denial of student activity funds to pay
for the cost of printing Wide Awake was discrimination on the basis of the
newspaper's Christian viewpoint concerning topics otherwise permitted in the
forum." 8 The university's policy denied funding not because Wide Awake
(1992) (the First Amendment's negative bar against an establishment of religion implies an affirmative Cs-
tablishment of a secular public order). To be sure, the Establishment Clause prohibits the establishment of a
national church, which of course was no more likely in 1789-91 than it is today. But the Clause does not
thereby establish a new religion of Secularism. Rather, no credo is by law established, setting at liberty the
hearts of all to embrace any faith or none, as each is persuaded concering such matters.
115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
" Id. at 2515.
"1 Id. at 2514-15.
"' Id. at 2513.
't' Id. at 2520-21.
"' Id. at 2516.
"' Id. at 2516-18.
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was a religious organization, but because of its religious perspective. " 9 Jus-
tice Kennedy also rejected the argument that providing student groups with a
scarce resource such as money differed from providing abundant resources
such as classroom meeting space. Whether abundant or in limited supply, the
university could not dispense its resources on a basis that was viewpoint-dis-
criminatory. "'
Justice Kennedy went on to reject the university's argument that providing
direct funding for a newspaper with a religious perspective was prohibited by
the Establishment Clause. In so doing, Justice Kennedy stated a rule of law
consistent with neutrality theory, although he added that compliance with a
neutrality rule was a significant factor-but not itself sufficient-in finding
that the Establishment Clause was not violated:
A central lesson of our decisions is that a significant factor in upholding
governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is
their neutrality towards religion .... [I]n enforcing the prohibition
against laws respecting establishment of religion, we must be sure that
we do not inadvertently prohibit the government from extending its
general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their reli-
gious belief ... We have held that the guarantee of neutrality is re-
spected, not offended, when the government, following neutral criteria
and evenhdnded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies
and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse.'
Continuing, Justice Kennedy assessed both the purpose and "practical details"
of the university's program. The university's purpose was clearly not the
advancement of religion. The student activity fee was to promote a wide
variety of speech of interest to students. Hence, the fee was unlike an ear-
marked tax for the support of religion.' As to the "practical details" that
augured in favor of constitutionality, Justice Kennedy noted that state funds
did not flow directly into the coffers of Wide Awake; rather, the newspaper's
outside printer was paid by the university upon submission of an invoice.'
Further, Justice Kennedy noted that Wide Awake was a student publication,
"not a religious institution, at least in the usual sense of that term as used in
our case law, and it is not a religious organization as used in the University's
"' Id. at 2515.
':' Id. at 2519-20.
Id. at 2521 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 2522.
' Id. at 2523-24.
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own regulations."'' 24
Although she joined the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor had greater
difficulty concluding that the Establishment Clause was not transgressed on
these facts. As between separatistic and neutrality models, she declared that
Rosenberger did not elevate neutrality as the new paradigm:
The Court's decision today therefore neither trumpets the supremacy of
the neutrality principle nor signals the demise of the funding prohibition
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.2 '
Accordingly, separationism appears to be Justice O'Connor's starting point in
cases involving direct funding of religious organizations. However, she found
several mitigating details which on balance satisfied her that providing assis-
tance in this case did not carry the danger of governmental funds' endorsing a
religious message. First, university policies made it clear that the ideas ex-
pressed by student organizations, including religious groups, were not those
of the university. Second, the funds were disbursed in a manner that ensured
monies would be used only for the university's purpose of maintaining a
robust marketplace of ideas. Finally, Justice O'Connor noted the possibility
that students who objected to their fees going toward ideas they opposed
iight not be compelled to pay the entire fee.'26
In addition to joining the majority opinion, Justice Thomas wrote separate-
ly to criticize the historical account in Justice Souter's dissent. Justice Thom-
as agreed with Justice Souter that history indicated that the Founders intended
the Establishment Clause to prevent earmarking a tax for the support of
religion. 7 However, the equal participation of religious and nonreligious
groups in a direct-aid program funded out of general tax revenues was never
an issue faced by the founding generation.'28 Hence, in Justice Thomas's
view, it is not prohibited by the Establishment Clause.
Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Concerning a direct-aid program funded by public monies, Justice Souter
'" Id. at 2524.
,' Id. at 2528 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
I( I. at 2526-27 (O'Connor, J.. concurring).
k/7 M. at 2528 and n.I (Thomas, J., concurring).
' Id. at 2528-30 (Thomas, J., concurring). Cf. id. at 2536 n.* (Souter, J.. dissenting). The Supreme
Court has already rejected an argument by federal taxpayers that the Free Exercise Clause is violated should
they as contributors to the nation's general tax revenues have to "pay for" benefits provided to religious
organizations. See .supra note 71.
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stated that any such program was unconstitutional if it used public monies to
support religion.'29 Hence, the four dissenting Justices followed a
separatistic model.
Justice Souter severely criticized Justice Kennedy's opinion insofar as it
made distinctions based on certain factual peculiarities of the case: the funds
going directly to the printer, not to the publication; the funds originating from
student-fees, not taxes; and the newspaper not being a religious organization,
although it espoused overtly religious beliefs.'30 The "practical details" sec-
tion of Justice Kennedy's opinion does appear to focus on minutiae. These
are indeed chimerical distinctions on which the Establishment Clause is seem-
ingly made to turn. In fairness to Justice Kennedy, however, he may have
been forced into these rationalizations in order to keep Justice O'Connor with
the majority. She supplied the crucial fifth vote. But if keeping Justice
O'Connor from separately concurring explains Justice Kennedy's attention to
"practical details," it came at a high price: officials and judges who do not
like the result in Rosenberger have plenty of fine distinctions to manipulate
so as to confine the case's holding narrowly to its facts.
In summary, concerning the constitutionality of general programs of direct
aid, from Pinette and Rosenberger we learn that presently four Justices are
prepared to allow a rule of neutrality, four Justices remain entrenched in
separationism as their theory, and Justice O'Connor is the swing vote. Al-
though it is clear that facial neutrality alone is insufficient, Justice O'Connor
was unwilling to commit to any broader statement of general legal principles.
It must be conceded that her instinct in these cases is not to begin with neu-
trality theory, but to follow a weak version of separationism. 3 ' She starts
with a presumption of no aid, but then advises weighing the totality of the
circumstances. If the legislation is facially neutral as to religion, if the pro-
gram is administered so that there is no appearance of official endorsement of
religion, and if there are sufficient safeguards against the welfare program's
functioning as a subterfuge for channeling tax monies- to support religion,
then she will allow a rule of neutrality.
3 2
' Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2535-39 (Souter, J., dissenting).
I" d. at 2544-47 (Souter, J., dissenting).
" Justice O'Connor's "no endorsement test," was first advanced in the Christmas nativity scene case
of Lyich v. Donnellv, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
C" In a departure from the separationist view, Justice O'Connor's no endorsement test is not a funds-
tracing analysis. Rather, her reliance on the objective -observer is an appearance-of-impropriety analysis.
Instead of focusing on whether religion is advanced by direct funding, as separationists do, Justice O'Connor
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In Rosenberger, as in Widmar, Lamb's Chapel, and Pinette, it was the Free
Speech Clause that compelled the equal treatment of religion.'33 In the ab-
sence of the free speech claim, there was no indication the Court would have
required-as a matter of constitutional right-that religion be treated equally
in welfare programs. It is uncertain whether the Court will do so."4 All that
can be said with assurance is that should a legislature choose to treat religion
in a nondiscriminatory manner when designing a program of aid, then a slim
majority of the present Court will uphold the aid. Accordingly, religious
social service providers have no certainty of equal treatment, but it is per-
mitted.'35
As we look at the progression from Widmar to Rosenberger in terms of the
Court's attitude toward enabling personal religious choice, there is a logical
continuum. The Court has moved toward neutralizing government's impact
on religious belief and practice. In Widmar, the Establishment Clause was not
is concerned with the civic alienation felt by her observer as she looks at welfare legislation aiding social
service providers, including those that are faith-based. Accordingly, the issue for Justice O'Connor is not
whether the aid has the effect of advancing religion, but whether it appears to single out religion for favorit-
ism.
03 See also Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir.). cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 360 (1996). Following Rosenberger and Pinette, the appeals court in Church on the Rock struck down a
congressional prohibition on private religious speech, thereby permitting access to senior citizen centers
funded in part by the federal government. The Free Speech Clause was again the source of the right to equal
treatment.
" The Free Exercise Clause prevents a legislature from adopting a welfare program in which a broad
array of providers, governmental and independent, are eligible, but expressly excluding faith-based providers
because they are religious. Thus, equal treatment is commanded by the Free Exercise as well as the Free
Speech Clause. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
While admitting to a prima facie violation of the Free Exercise Clause, separationists argue that stop-
ping all funding to religious organizations serves the "compelling interest" of compliance with the Estab-
lishment Clause. But this argument was rejected as to the Free Speech Clause in Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at
2520-25. Moreover, there is nothing in the wording of the First Amendment that suggests that when clauses
ostensibly "conflict," the Establishment Clause overrides the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. One
could just as easily presume that the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses supersede the Establishment
Clause. Of course, there is no conflict between these Clauses when the neutrality principle is followed. See
infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
"' It might be asked whether the Court majority would still have found the Establishment Clause de-
fense unsuccessful in Widmar. Lamb s Chapel Pinette, and Rosenberger. in the absence of the claimants'
successful free speech claim. The answer is "yes." In each case the free speech and no-establishment ques-
tions were considered independently of the other. Never did the Court suggest that the Free Speech Clause
overrode the Establishment Clause. In each case the government voluntarily opened a limited public forum,
and it was clear the government retained the authority to close the forum to all speakers. Free speech did not
add the margin of victory over the no-aid-to-religion defense. What is required of government is that it have
a secular purpose for its benefit program. That purpose may be the provision of a forum for a diverse array
of speech, but the purpose may also be meeting the welfare needs of the poor.
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violated when the government provided a direct benefit in the form of re-
served meeting space (classrooms, heat, and light) because of the larger pub-
lic purpose at issue-enriching the marketplace of ideas. In Rosenberger, the
Establishment Clause was not violated when the government provided a direct
benefit in the form of funding (paid printing costs) for the same reason as in
Widmar-the larger public purpose of enriching the marketplace of ideas.
Both the classroom space and payment of printing costs were valuable bene-
fits to which a sum certain could be assigned. Free access to other forms of
valuable direct benefits easily come to mind: bulletin boards, photocopy ma-
chines, computers for word processing and e-mail, facsimile machines, orga-
nizational mailboxes, organizational office space, and even something as
common as use of a telephone. All of these direct benefits when provided to
a wide variety of student organizations, including organizations that are either
religious or have religious viewpoints, would be permitted by the
Widmar/Rosenberger interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
Indeed, there is no logical stopping place as the circumstance evolves from
funding private expression without regard to religion to funding a social pro-
gram without regard to religion. The essential requisite, as far as the Estab-
lishment Clause is concerned, is that in the case of expression, the creation of
the public forum have a public purpose. In the case of a social service pro-
gram, its enactment must have a public purpose as well.
The general principle of law that emerges is that the Establishment Clause
is not violated when, for a public purpose, a program of direct aid is made
available to an array of providers selected without regard to religion. In re-
cently enacting the Church Arson Prevention Act,'36 Congress made use of
this principle. Section 4(a) of the Act enables nonprofit organizations exempt
under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which are victims of arson
or terrorism as a result of racial or religious animus, to obtain federally guar-
anteed loans through private lending institutions.'37 This of course means
churches can obtain the necessary credit to repair or rebuild their houses of
worship at reduced rates. The Act, quite sensibly, treats churches the same as
all similarly situated exempt nonprofit organizations. The public purpose is to
assist the victims of crime. The federal guarantee represents a form of direct
aid to religion, but because the aid is neutrally available to all 501(c)(3) orga-
nizations, it does not violate the Establishment Clause.
"6 Pub. L. 104-155, 104th Cong., (1996), signed into law by the President on July 3, 1996.
'. Id. at § 4(a)(1).
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In the context of welfare legislation, the public purpose is for government
and the independent sector to engage in a cooperative program that addresses
the temporal needs of the ultimate beneficiaries, 38 and to do so in a manner
that enhances the quality or quantity of the services to those beneficiaries. If
some of the providers happen (indeed, are known) to be religious, and in the
course of administering their programs they integrate therein religious beliefs
and practices, that is of no concern to the government. As long as the benefi-
ciaries have a choice as to where they can obtain services, thereby preventing
any religious coercion of beneficiaries, and as long as the public purpose of
the program is met,'39 the government's interest is at an end. 40
For a welfare program to have a public purpose, more is required than that
the program merely be facially neutral as to religion. 4' The legislation must
have as its genuine object the pursuit of the good of civil society. Permissible
public purposes encompass health (including freedom from addictions), safe-
." ' See § 104 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 604a (1996 Supp.). Known by the popular name of "Charitable Choice," § 104 permits states to
involve faith-based providers in the delivery of welfare services funded by the federal government through
block grants to the states. Subsection 104(e) provides that ifa beneficiary has a religious objection to receiv-
ing social services from a faith-based provider, he or she has a right to obtain services from a different pro-
vider.
,3 This can be accomplished by fiscal audits of monies from governmental sources, as well as by end-
result evaluations during performance reviews undertaken to ensure that the needs of the beneficiaries tar-
geted by the legislation are being served. Such intrusions are a tolerable level of interaction between religion
and government.
"' An example of this model is found in the regulations to the federal Child Care Block Grant Act of
1990, providing, inter alia, certificates to low-income parents who may then "spend" the benefit at the child
care provider they select for their child. The regulations state that the monies from such certificates:
(3) May be used for child care services provided by a sectarian organization or agency,
including those that engage in religious activities, if those services are chosen by the parent; [and]
(4) May be expended by providers for any sectarian purpose or activity, including sectari-
an worship or instruction ....
42 C.F.R. § 98.30(c).
" Inquiry into "purpose" may go beyond the mere text or "face" of a statute. Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye. Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533-35 (1993). see Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 699 (1994).
Legislative purpose, however, should not be confused with legislative motive. A judicial inquiry may
not go into the subjective motive of each legislator supporting a legislative bill. A motive analysis would not
only have implications for the denial of religious freedom (McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 616, 641 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)), but also for violating the separation of powers (United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)). See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) (plurality
opinion) ("Even if some legislators were motivated by a conviction that religious speech in particular was
valuable and worthy of protection, that alone would not invalidate the Act, because what is relevant is the
legislative purpose of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law.").
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ty, morals, or meeting temporal needs, such as shelter, food, clothing, and
employment.
Unlike separationism, in neutrality theory it makes no difference whether a
provider is "pervasively sectarian" or whether the nature of the direct aid is
such that it can be diverted to a religious use.'42 Most importantly, the
courts no longer need to ensure that governmental funds are used exclusively
for "secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes"'43 as opposed to worship
or religious instruction. Neutrality theory eliminates the need for the judiciary
to engage in such alchemy.
For faith-based providers to retain their religious character, programs of aid
must be written to specially exempt them from regulatory burdens that would
frustrate or compromise their religious character. Not only is this essential to
attracting their pariicipation, but it is in the government's interest for these
providers to retain the spiritual character so central to their success in rehabil-
itating.the poor and needy.' The line of cases typified by the holding in
Amos gives assurance that the adoption of such exemptions do not violate the
Establishment Clause.
145
In neutrality theory it might be asked, "Just what is left of the Establish-
ment Clause?" The answer is, "Quite a lot!" In addition to the several appli-
cations noted elsewhere in this Article, 146 the Establishment Clause contin-
ues to prohibit the government from adopting or administering a welfare
program out of a purpose that is inherently religious. 4 For example, the
14. To require states to distinguish between "pervasively" and "non-pervasively" sectarian organizations
would seem to violate one of the venerable rules of the Establishment Clause, to the effect that government
is not to intentionally discriminate among religious groups. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). See
also supra notes 59-63, and accompanying text. Under neutrality theory this inconsistency is avoided.
' Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist. 413 U.S. 756, 780 (1973).
'" See HENRY G. CISNEROS, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEv., HIGHER GROUND: FAITH COM-
MUNITIES AND COMMUNITY BUILDING 6-12 (1996) (citing studies and examples of the success of faith-based
community development activities); NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND
WELFARE, AN EVALUATION OF THE TEEN CHALLENGE TREATMENT PROGRAM (1977) (showing a materially
higher success rate for faith-based over secular drug treatment programs for youth); Religious Institutions as
Partners in Communily Based Development, in PROGRESSIONS: A LILLY ENDOWMENT OCCASIONAL REPORT
(Feb. 1995) (noting success with community-based development that came only after involving the local
church).
" See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
i See supra notes 59-63, 78-79, 87, 93, infra notes 149-51 and accompanying texts.
"Inherently religious" means those intrinsic and exclusively religious activities of worship and the
propagation or inculcation of the sort of matters that comprise confessional statements or creeds. In addition,
the term includes the supernatural claims of churches, mosques, synagogues, temples, and other houses of
1997]
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no-establishment principle does not permit as the object of legislation the
pursuit of worship, religious teaching, prayer, proselytizing, or devotional
Bible reading. 48 Characterizing the purpose of a program of aid as "nonsec-
tarian" or "secular" should be avoided, for that just clouds the issue. Mere
overlap between a statutory purpose and religious belief or practice does not,
without more, make the legislation unconstitutional. 149 Finally, although the
Establishment Clause does require a public purpose, the neutrality principle is
not concerned with unintended effects among religions. Accordingly, the
Establishment Clause is not offended should a general program of aid affect,
for good or ill, some religious providers more than others, 5 ' as long as any
worship, using those words not to identify buildings, but to describe the confessional community around
which a religion identifies and defines itself, conducts its worship, teaches doctrine, and propagates the faith
to children and adult converts.
Although a view of religion and life as an integrated whole is desirable, for purposes of the Establish-
ment Clause it becomes necessary to recognize that some core beliefs and practices are "inherently reli-
gious." The necessity of a fixed boundary in church/state relations requires a uniform legal standard in draw-
ing the line of church/state separation. The line of separation cannot be drawn differently for each religious
organization based on its own unique definition of religion. That would amount to governmental discrimina-
tion among religions (a violation of the rule stated in Larson, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)).
This is not to say that the Supreme Court has resolved all the definitional problems by confining
Establishment Clause analysis to matters "inherently religious." The Court's determination as to what is
"inherently religious" inevitably will favor the philosophy of modem rationalism (its underlying tenets will
appear arguably nonreligious) while disfavoring familiar theistic religions such as Christianity, Judaism, and
Islam (their tenets and practices appearing inherently religious). See Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Com-
promise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 834-35 (1984). But as stated above.
this is a consequence of the impossibility of the Establishment Clause's being "neutral" as to all world
views. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
"' The Supreme Court has found that prayer, devotional Bible reading, veneration of the Ten Com-
mandments, classes in confessional religion, and the biblical story of creation are all inherently religious. See
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prayer); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (creationism);
Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (prayer); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (Ten
Commandments); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (creationism): School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (prayer and Bible reading); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer); McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (teaching religion).
On the other hand, legislation restricting abortion, Sunday closing laws, rules prohibiting interracial
marriage, and teenage sexuality counseling are not inherently religious. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589 (1988) (teenage counseling). Bob Jones Univ. v. United States. 461 U.S. 574. 604 n.30 (1983) (interra-
cial marriage); Harris v. McRae. 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (abortion restrictions); McGowan v. Maryland. 366
U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing law); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown. Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961) (Sunday closing law).
' The Establishment Clause is not violated when a governmental social program merely reflects a
moral judgment, shared by some religions, about conduct thought beneficial (or harmful) to society.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 604 n.8, 613; Hairis, 448 U.S. at 319-20; McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442; Hennington v.
Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1896); see Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 n.30. Thus, overlap between a
law's purpose and the moral teaching of some religions does not, without more, render the law one "respect-
ing an establishment of religion."
"' The Supreme Court has held that when a law of general public purpose has a disparate effect on
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disparate effect is unintentional.'
State constitutions also address the matter of church/state relations, some-
times in terms that are more separatistic than the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the Establishment Clause.'52 A program of aid that successfully
navigates the First Amendment can nonetheless go aground on claims based
on state constitutional law. However, if the welfare program is federal or
federal revenues are shared with the states, then these state constitutions can
be preempted by Congress.
CONCLUSION
As one facet of the nation's overall effort to reform welfare, it is impera-
tive to increase the involvement of the independent sector in the delivery of
government-assisted social services. A significant part of the voluntary sector
presently engaged in social work consists of faith-based nonprofit organiza-
tions. Indeed, these religious charities are some of the most efficient social
service providers, as well as among the most successful, measured in terms of
lives permanently changed for the better.'53 Although some faith-based pro-
viders have been willing to participate in government-assisted programs,
many are wary about involvement with the government because they rightly
fear the debasing of their religious character and expression." Consequent-
ly, what is needed is legislation that invites the equal participation of faith-
based organizations as social service providers, while safeguarding their reli-
gious character, which is the very source of their genius and success.
Achieving this goal will require change in how Americans conceive of the
role of modem government, which fortunately is already underway. For start-
ers, the activity of government must not be thought of as monopolizing the
various religious organizations, the Establishment Clause is not violated. Hemandez v. Commissioner, 490
U.S. 680, 696 (1989); Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 n.30; Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 n.23.
"' The Supreme Court has held that the Establishment Clause prohibits government from purposefully
discriminating among religious groups. Larson, 456 U.S. 228; Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953);
Niemotko v. Maryland. 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
'" See F. William O'Brien, The Blaine Amendment 1875-1876, 41 U. DET. L.J. 137 (1963); Note,
Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of Church and State Through State Constitutional
Provisions, 71 VA. L. REV. 625 (1985). Although dated, a useful work in the area of religion and state con-
stitutions is CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU Er AL., RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1965).
See supra note 144.
j See ESBECK, supra note 62; STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX: RELIGIOUS
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY (1996).
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"public." Rather, civil society is comprised of many intermediate institutions
and communities that also serve public purposes, including the independent
sector of nonprofit faith-based providers.
Further, independent sector providers that opt to participate in a
government welfare program are not in any primary sense to be regarded as
"beneficiaries" of the government's assistance. Rather, it is those who are the
ultimate object of the social service program-the hungry, the homeless, the
alcoholic, the teenage mother-who are the beneficiaries of taxpayer funds.
As they deliver services to those in need with such remarkable efficiency and
effectiveness, faith-based providers, along with others in the voluntary sector,
give far more in value, measured in societal betterment, than they could pos-
sibly receive as an incident of their expanded responsibilities. This is not a
case of tax dollars funding religion.
Rightly interpreted, the Establishment Clause does not require that faith-
based providers censor their religious expression and secularize their identity
as conditions of participation in a governmental program. So long as the
welfare program has as its object the public purpose of society's better-
ment-that is, help for the poor and needy-and so long as the program is
equally open to all providers, religious and secular, then the First Amendment
requirement that the law be neutral as to religion is fully satisfied.
Neutfality theory has the additional virtue of eliminating existing "conflict"
among the clauses of the First Amendment. By not discriminating between
"pervasively" and "non-pervasively sectarian" organizations, the Court's inter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause is brought into line with the rule of
Larson v. Valente"' prohibiting intentional discrimination among religious
groups, and avoids as well excessive inquiry into the character of religious
organizations.'56 By not discriminating in favor of secular organizations
over religious organizations through the funding of only the former, the
Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause is brought into line with
the rule of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah' pro-
hibiting intentional discrimination against religion. And by not discriminating
against private religious speech in either content or viewpoint, the Court's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause is in line with longstanding free
'- 456 U.S. 228. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
508 U.S. 520 (1993). See supra notes 26 and 134.
[Vol. 46
HeinOnline  -- 46 Emory L. J. 40 1997
1997] FAITH-BASED SERVICE PROVIDERS 41
speech doctrine as adhered to in Rosenberger. The separationist view that
when in "conflict," the Establishment Clause subordinates the Free Exercise
and Free Speech Clauses has heightened religious tensions over political mat-
ters. Contrariwise, the neutrality principle promises to reduce political fac-
tionalism along religious lines.
As First Amendment law evolves away from separationism and in the di-
rection of neutrality theory, it is inevitable that there will be setbacks. But the
neutrality principle has about it the march of an idea, one that is compelling
because it unleashes liberty, limits government, and reinvigorates citizen in-
volvement at the neighborhood level. For the sake of America's poor and
needy, we can only hope that the Supreme Court's full embrace of neutrality
will come soon.
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